Question One. Whether the Blessed Virgin was Conceived in Original Sin

1. About the third distinction I ask whether the blessed Virgin was conceived in original sin.a

a.a [Interpolation] About this third distinction, where the Master deals with the quality of the nature assumed, two questions are asked: one about the Mother, and the other about the Offspring. The first is whether the blessed Virgin was conceived in original sin; the second is about the sanctification of the body of Christ, namely why and how it did not contract original sin. Argument is made about the first.

2. That she was:

“In Adam all sinned,” Romans 5.12, but only because all were in Adam as to seed-reasons; thus was the blessed Virgin in Adam;     therefore etc     .

3. Again, Damascene Orthodox Faith ch.48, “The Holy Spirit purified her;” there is no purifying save from sin;     therefore she had sin; not actual sin; therefore etc     .

4. Further Augustine [rather Fulgentius] On the Faith to Peter n.69, “Most firmly hold and do not at all doubt that every man who is conceived by the lying together of man and woman is born with original sin” (and the authority is in Lombard’s text 2 d.30 ch.7 n.4); but the blessed Virgin Mary was conceived by the lying together     etc .; therefore          etc .

5. Again Augustine [On the Gospel of John tr.4 n.10] on John 1.29, ‘Behold the lamb of God etc .’, says, “Only he is innocent who did not so come,” namely did not come by common propagation.

6. Again Pope Leo On the Nativity of the Lord [serm.1 ch.1], “Just as he found none free of guilt, so he came for the freeing of all;” therefore      etc.

7. Again Jerome on Psalm 21.21, ‘And my only one from the hand of the dog’, seems to say the same thing [Ps.-Jerome Breviary on the Psalms, “The ‘dogs’, the Jews; ‘my only one’, that is the soul of Christ. It is called ‘the only one’ because that soul did not have sin, and other souls are cleansed by it”].

8. Again the decree ‘On Consecration’ at ‘Nativity’, and in the gloss [Gratian, Decretum p.3 d.3 ch.1, “Announcement must be made to the laity so that they may know the times for celebrating feast days during the year, namely: every Sunday... And to be celebrated during the year are these days: the Birthday of the Lord.., the Nativity of his holy Mother. But the other festivities during the year are neither compulsory for being celebrated nor forbidden.” Huguccio Pisanus Glosses on Gratian p.3 d.3 ch.1, “Nothing is said in the Decretum about the feast of the Conception [of the Virgin], for it is not to be celebrated the way it is done in many regions, and especially in England; and the reason is that she was conceived in sin as were also the other saints - the single exception being the person of Christ”].

9. Further, Bernard says about her conception that “she was conceived in original sin” [Sermons, On the Assumption of blessed Mary, serm.2 n.8, “She contracted the original stain from her parents., for it is agreed by all that Mary was cleansed of original sin by grace alone”].

10. Again Anselm Why God Man 2.16 [“The Virgin herself, from whom Christ is assumed, was conceived in sin, and in sin did her mother conceive her and with original sin was she born, since she too sinned in Adam, in whom all have sinned”].

11. Again this same thing is maintained by Bernard in a certain epistle, and he proves that she was not sanctified before her conception (as is plain), nor in her conception, because lust was there [Bernard, Epistle to the Canons of Lyons n.7, “Whence then comes the sanctity of her conception? Is it said that this was by prevenient sanctification.? But she was not able to be holy before she existed; indeed she did not exist before she was conceived. Or perhaps it is said.that she was sanctified and conceived at the same time? Neither, indeed, does reason admit this.; how was sin not there where lust was not lacking?... What is left is to believe that she received sanctification when already existing in the womb after conception”].

12. On the contrary:

Augustine On Nature and Grace ch.36 n.42 (and it is in Lombard’s text), “When sin is under discussion, I wish no question to be raised about Mary.”

13. And Anselm On the Virginal Conception ch.18, “It was fitting that the Virgin should shine with that purity than which no greater below God can be conceived;” but a pure innocence below God of the sort that was in Christ can be conceived;     therefore etc     .

I. To the Question

A. The Common Opinion

1. Exposition of the Opinion

14. The common statement is, yes [that Mary was conceived in original sin], because of the authorities taken up, and because of arguments from two middle terms:Vatican editors: Alexander of Hales, ST 3 n.75, “The blessed Virgin could not have been sanctified in her parents; on the contrary, it was necessary that she would contract sin from her parents in being generated;” n.76, “The blessed Virgin could not have been sanctified in her conception;” n.78, “The glorious Virgin was sanctified in her mother’s womb before her birth after infusion of soul in her body.” Albert the Great Sentences 3 d.3 a.4, “The blessed Virgin was not sanctified before animation; and to say the opposite is a heresy;” ad 1, “This statement is false: that the Holy Spirit preceded her soul in the body by sanctifying grace inhabiting the body;” a.5, “She was sanctified before birth from the womb^, more probably soon after animation.” Thomas Aquinas Sentences 3 d.3 a.1 a.1 q.2, “The sanctification of the blessed Virgin could not have fittingly been before the infusion of the soul, because she was not yet capable of grace; but nor even in the very instant of infusion, namely so that by the grace then infused in her she would have been preserved from incurring original guilt;” a.2 q.2 ad 3, “Christ’s Virgin Mother was indeed infected with original sin, but she was cleansed of it before she was born from the womb;” Quodlibet 6 q.5 a.1, “Now the blessed Virgin proceeded thus from Adam...and therefore she was conceived in original sin...The belief is... that she was sanctified quickly after conception and infusion of soul.” Bonaventure Sentences 3 d.3 p.1 a.1 q.2, “Now the position of others is that the sanctification of the Virgin was subsequent to the contraction of original sin...And this way of speaking is more common and more reasonable and more safe...Adhering to this position.let us hold.that the sanctification of the Virgin was after contraction of original sin.” Richard of Middleton Sentences 3 d.3 princ.1 q.1, “The soul.of the Virgin, from its union with the flesh, contracted original sin.” Giles of Rome Sentences 3 d.3 q.1 a.1, “We will say that she was conceived in original sin as are also other women, but it is piously believed that almost immediately after she was conceived in original sin she was cleansed of it and sanctified in the womb;” also Quodlibet 6 q.20. Many other authors too. ³⁸

One of these is the excellence of the Son himself;Vatican editors: John de la Rochelle Quaestiones Disputatae q.1, “If the blessed Virgin.does not have the guilt of sin she does not need redemption.She was redeemed by Christ; therefore she was conceived in sin.” Bonaventure Sentences 3 d.3 p.1 a.1 q.2 arg.5 in opp., “If then the blessed Virgin lacked original sin, it seems that she does not belong to the redemption of Christ; but there is great glory for Christ from the saints whom he has redeemed; therefore, if he did not redeem the blessed Virgin, he is deprived of the noblest glory.; this is a profane and impious thing to say.” Thomas Aquinas Sentences 3 d.3 q.1 a.1 qc.2, “Christ singly has this among the human race, that he does not need redemption, because he is our head but it belongs to all to be redeemed through him; but this could not be if any soul were found which had never been infected with the original stain; and therefore this was conceded neither to the Virgin nor to anyone else besides Christ;” Quodlibet 6 q.5 a.1; ST IIIa q.27 a.2, “If the blessed Virgin had not incurred the stain of original guilt.she would not have needed the redemption and salvation that comes through Christ.; but this is unacceptable, that Christ was not the savior of all men.” Bonaventure Sentences 3 d.3 p.1 a.1 q.2 arg.6 in opp., “Again, if the blessed Virgin did not have original sin, and if to none the door is closed save as desert for original sin, then it seems that, if she had died before Christ, she would at once have flown to heaven; therefore it does not seem that the door was opened to all by Christ.” ³⁹ for, as universal redeemer, he opened the door for everyone; but if blessed Mary had not contracted original sin she would not have needed a redeemer and her Son would not have opened the door for her, because it would not have been closed to her (for it is only closed because of sin, and especially original sin).a

a.a [Interpolation] Again Augustine in book 1 on the baptism of infants [On the Merits of Sinners 1.29 n.57] says, “Only Christ was born without sin [whom the Virgin conceived without male embrace].” Again in book 2 [ibid., 2.29 n.47] the same Augustine says that the barrier came through sin, and because of it men were excluded from the entrance of the heavenly fatherland, and the door was opened by the passion of Christ; therefore the blessed Virgin, if she had been without sin and had died before the passion of her Son, would have entered heaven, and so the door would not have been opened for all by Christ; consequently the blessed Virgin would not have needed the redemption of her Son.

15. The second middle term comes from what is evident in the blessed Virgin:Vatican editors: Bonaventure Sentences 3 d.3 p.1 a.1 q.2, “Being precedes well being; therefore the soul was first united to the flesh before the grace of God was infused in it... So it is necessary to posit that the infection of original guilt was there before sanctification was.” Thomas Aquinas Sentences 3 d.3 q.3 a.1 qc.1 and ad 1; Quodlibet 6 q.5 a1, “Now the blessed Virgin proceeded thus from Adam, because she was born from the commingling of the sexes, as others also are; and therefore she was conceived with original sin and is included in the totality of them, about which totality the Apostle says in Romans 5, ‘in whom all have sinned,’ and from this totality Christ alone is excepted;” ST IIIa q.27 a.2 ad 4. Also references in Richard of Middleton, Henry of Ghent, Giles of Rome. ⁴⁰ For she was propagated according to the common law and consequently her body was propagated by and formed from infected seed - and so the same idea of infection was in her body as is also in the body of anyone else propagated from the origin; and since the soul is infected by the infected body, the same idea of infection was in her soul as is also in the souls of others commonly propagated.

16. Likewise, she had the penalties common to human nature (as thirst, hunger, and the like), which are inflicted on us because of original sin;Vatican editors: Bonaventure Sentences 3 d.3 p.1 a.1 q.1, “Almost everyone holds that the blessed Virgin had original sin, since this is apparent from the manifold penalties in her, which one cannot say she suffered for the redemption of others, and which one cannot say she had by assuming them -but by contraction [of sin];” d.15 a.1 q.3 ad4. Thomas Aquinas ST IIIa 1.27 a.3 arg.1. ⁴¹ and these were not voluntarily taken up by her, because she was not our redeemer and repairer, for then her Son would not have been the general redeemer of all; therefore, they were inflicted on her by God - and not unjustly inflicted; therefore they were inflicted after sin, and thus she was not innocent.

2. Rejection of the Opinion

a. Against the First Reason

17. Against the first reason [n.14] the argument that she did not contract original sin is taken from the excellence of her Son - insofar as he was redeemer, reconciler, and mediator.

For the most perfect mediator has the most perfect act of mediating possible with respect to some person for whom he mediates;     therefore Christ had the most perfect degree of mediating possible with respect to some person with respect to whom he was mediator; but with respect to no person did he have a more excellent degree than with respect to Mary; therefore etc     .

18. But this would not be the case unless he had merited to preserve her from original sin. I prove it in three ways: first in comparison to God to whom he reconciles; second in comparison to the evil from which he liberates; third by comparison to the obligation of the person whom he reconciled.

19. [In comparison to God to whom he reconciles] - To see the first proof I set down an example in agreement with Anselm’s example in Why God Man 2.16: someone, when offending a king, injures the king so much that the king is offended in all the person’s natural sons and, being offended, disinherits him [and them] etc.; this offence is set down as not to be remitted unless someone innocent offers to the king some obedience that placates and pleases the king more than the sin was offensive to him; someone does offer an obedience thus pleasing, and reconciles the sons to the king so that they are not disinherited; yet the king is offended in each son, although he afterwards remits the offense because of the merits of the mediator. But if the mediator could supremely and most perfectly please the king, he would anticipate the king with respect to some son such that the king would not be offended in that son - for this would be greater than if the king remits now to the son an offense held against him; nor is this impossible, since the offense does not come from the son’s own guilt but was contracted from another.

20. From this example the argument goes as follows: no one supremely or most perfectly placates someone for someone’s contracting an offense unless he can prevent that someone from being offended in the other, for if he placates him so as to remit the offense when he is already offended, he does not most perfectly placate him; and indeed in the issue at hand God is not offended in the soul because of an interior motion in God himself, but only because of guilt in that very soul; therefore Christ does not most perfectly placate the Trinity for Adam’s sons contracting guilt if he does not prevent the Trinity from being offended in someone and if the soul of some son of Adam does not have such guilt - and consequently some soul of some son of Adam does not have such guilt, or it is possible that he not have the guilt.

21. [In comparison to the evil from which he liberates] - In the second way the argument is twofold:

First, because the most perfect mediator merits the removal of all punishment from him whom he reconciles; but original guilt is a greater punishment than the lack itself of the divine vision, as was made clear in 2 d.36 nn.170-173, because sin is for an intellectual nature the greatest of all its punishments;     therefore if Christ has most perfectly reconciled us to God, he merited to take away from someone this gravest of punishments - but not from anyone but his Mother, therefore etc     . This is confirmed by the example, because if the greatest punishment for a son of Adam were that the king was offended in him, no one would most perfectly reconcile him unless he took away from him not only his being disinherited but also his being an enemy of the king’s, etc.

22. In this same second way the argument proceeds secondly as follows: Christ seems more immediately to have been our repairer and reconciler from original sin than from actual sin, because the necessity for the incarnation and passion of Christ is commonly assigned to original sin [Alexander of Hales, Bonaventure, Aquinas, Richard of Middleton]; but it is commonly supposed [Albert the Great, Bonaventure, Aquinas, Peter of Tarentaise (Innocent V), Richard of Middleton] that Christ was a very perfect mediator of some person, to wit Mary, because he preserved her from all actual sin; therefore, similarly, he preserved her from original sin.

23. [In comparison to the obligation of the person whom he reconciled] - In the third way I argue as follows: a reconciled person is not supremely obliged to a mediator unless he have from him the highest good that can be had from him; but the innocence in question, namely preservation from contracted sin or from contracting sin, can be had through the mediator; therefore no person will be supremely bound to Christ as mediator if Christ preserved no one from original sin.

24. And if you say that a person to whom sin is remitted is [not?] equally as much bound as a person who is preserved from sin, because of the saying of Luke 7.47, ‘He who is forgiven more loves more’ - look at the response there of Augustine,Sermon 99 ch.6: “But O you who say that you did not commit many sins. Wherefore? Ruled by whom?... This man committed many and was made debtor for many; that man, being governed by God, committed few. The former attributes to God that he dismissed them; the latter attributes to God that he did not commit them... Recognize then the grace of him to whom you also owe that you did not commit them.” On Holy Virginity ch.41 n.41, “Reckon for yourselves as altogether dismissed by God all evil whatever that was - under his rule - not committed by you.” ⁴² that all non-committed sins are dismissed as if they were committed sins; indeed, it is a more excellent kindness to preserve from evil than to allow to fall into evil and to liberate from it afterwards.

25. It seems too that, when Christ merited grace and glory for many souls, and when these souls are debtors to Christ for grace and glory as to their mediator, why will there be no soul a debtor to him for innocence? And why, although all the blessed angels are innocent, will no human soul in the fatherland be innocent save Christ’s soul alone?

b. Against the Second Reason

26. The second reason [n.15], which was taken from what is evident in Mary, does not seem conclusive:

For what is argued first, about infection of the flesh on account of begetting from seed, does not proceed according to Anselm’s way of original sin, as was touched on in 2. d.30 nn.30-32, 48-67 [Anselm holds that original sin is lack of owed original justice]. Or, given that commonly original sin is thus contracted [sc. from infection of flesh, as held by Lombard et al.], yet the infection of flesh - which remains after baptism - is not a necessary cause that original sin remain in the soul but, while the infection remains, original sin is destroyed because of the grace conferred on the soul; thus God could destroy the infection in the first instance of the Virgin’s conception by then giving her grace, so that there would be no necessary cause of infection in her soul but grace would take away the guilt in her soul.

27. The other point, about the sufferings of Mary [n.16], is not conclusive; for the mediator can so reconcile someone that penalties useless to him are taken away from him and he is left in penalties useful to him; original guilt would not have been useful to Mary; temporal penalties were useful to her, because in them she earned merit;     therefore etc     .

B. Scotus’ own Response

28. As to the question I say that God could have acted so that Mary had never been in original sin; he could also have acted so that she was in sin only at one instant [Henry of Ghent, infra n.30]; he could also have acted so that she was in sin for some time and was purged in the last instant of that time [the common opinion, nn.14-16].

29. I clarify the first: since grace is equivalent to original justice as concerns divine acceptation, so that - because of it - original sin is not in a soul possessed of grace, God could in the first instant of the soul have poured into it as much grace as he poured into another soul at circumcision or baptism; therefore in its first instant the soul would not have had original sin, just as neither would it have had original sin afterwards when the person was baptized. And if the infection of the flesh was there in the first instant, it was not a necessary cause of infection in the soul, just as neither was it after baptism when - according to many [Lombard et al, see Scotus Ord. 2 dd.30-34 nn.29, 33] - it remains and the infection in the soul does not remain; or the flesh could have been cleansed before the infusion of the soul, so that in that instant the soul was not infected.

30. The second [n.28, Henry of GhentQuodlibet 15 q.13, “Was it possible, according to nature, that the Virgin, in the instant in which she was conceived a human being from seed according to the body and in which the soul was united to the body, could truly have contracted original sin and remained in the sin only for that instant? And it seems to me that this is very well possible... When a fava bean is moved upwards with violent motion and meets something moved more forcefully, to wit a millstone falling naturally downwards, it is, by the sudden contact of the stone, altered in an instant into a space equal thereto by the natural motion of the stone pushing the fava bean downwards, so that it is not possible for the fava bean to rest in a space equal to itself in the way it would have rested if it were left to itself. And this example, as it seems to me, is valid.for our present purpose: for the corporeal human form has being.in the first moment of its generation from the seed., and in the same instant the human body.has infected being.; and in the same instant the rational soul is created in the body...and thereby the soul contracts from the body the stain of original sin.; and in the whole preceding time the soul did not have that stain, because it did not have being; nor did [the stain] have being in the Virgin during the subsequent time, as I reckon becomes the dignity of the Virgin, in the way it is possible according to nature, so that only in passing and in an instant was she in original sin; that is to say, original sin had in that instant first and final being at once, but according to different indications of that instant, because as the instant was the term of past time, original sin had in it first being., but as the instant was the beginning of subsequent time, original sin had in it final being by the subsequent impulse of the motion of grace, as by a superior expelling original sin in that subsequent time. Thus it seems to me that original sin could have been in the Virgin for the sole moment of an instant. But whether it so happened God knows - and I neither know it nor assert it, but it seems reasonable to me and possible that, in accord with the aforesaid, it did happen.” ⁴³] is plain, because a natural agent can begin to act in an instant such that in that instant it will have been at rest under one contrary and in the immediate time it is in a state of becoming under the contrary form; but whenever a natural agent can act, God can act; therefore he can cause grace in the time immediate to some instant. There is also confirmation of this because, when the soul is in sin, it can, by divine power, be in grace; but in the time when the Virgin was conceived she could have been in sin and, for you [Henry], she was; therefore likewise she could have been in grace.

31. Nor was it then necessary that she would have been in grace in the first instant of the time, just as neither was this necessary in the case of alteration and motion [n.30 footnote].

32. Further, if God had created grace in the first instant, the third member [n.30] could be there posited, and God could have conserved this grace in the immediate time.

33. The third [n.28] is manifest.

34. But as to which one happened among these three that have been shown to be possible, God knows; but if it not be repugnant to the authority of the Church or to the authority of Scripture, then to attribute to Mary the more excellent seems probable.

C. Objections and their Solution

35. Against the third of these members [n.32] there is a twofold objection:

First as follows: whatever God does immediately in respect of some creature he does in an instant, because (Physics 8.10.266b4-5) an infinite power acts in an instant, for a finite and an infinite power cannot act with equal measure; therefore God cannot, after the instant of guilt, justify the soul through grace in the immediate time.

36. Further, was the justification a motion or was it an alteration? Not an alteration because it would not happen in an instant. Not motion because there would be no succession according to parts of the movable thing, namely of the soul, because the soul is indivisible; nor according to parts of the form, namely of grace; nor according to means between extremes, for there is no mean between privative opposites in respect of a naturally fit subject, just as there is absolutely none between contradictories; nor is one of these opposites acquired or lost part by part; nor is the subject divisible.

37. To the first objection [n.35] I say that if God voluntarily, and not necessarily, acts in an instant of some time, he must wait for the ‘then’ so that he may act in a determinate instant of the time; but he can act in a time in whose first instant he did not act; it is therefore true that God can do in an instant what he does immediately, but it is not necessary for him to act in an instant.

38. To the second [n.36] I say that, when speaking strictly about motion and alteration in the way the Philosopher does [cf. d.2 n.117 supra], passive justification is neither motion nor alteration but has something of both: from alteration it has that it is in a subject as a simple and indivisible form; from time and motion it has that it is in no indivisible measure but is in time, and in this respect it fails of being alteration. But it fails of being motion because it is not a flow according to the parts of the form and of the movable thing, or according to means between extremes, for here there are no means, as was proved [n.36].

39. Here is an example of this: a movable thing passes from the form under which it was in the ultimate instant of rest in such a way that, after that instant, there is a continuous losing of the form according to its parts and a continuous acquiring of the opposite form. If the opposite form were present in the whole time then, since its parts would not be acquired successively, it would be like the issue at hand, because then the acquiring of the form would be neither motion nor alteration, just as the passage now from alteration to motion is neither alteration nor motion.

40. But why is an undergoing caused by a natural agent an alteration or a motion but this is not?

I reply that if a natural agent can introduce a form suddenly, it introduces it through alteration; and if it cannot, it must act in time and so through motion and so by moving. But God, although he can introduce a form in an instant, yet - if he were not to introduce it in an instant - he can introduce the whole of it in time such that he does not introduce it part after part; for being able to act in time is not a mark of imperfection in an agent, although the necessity of acting in time is an imperfection.

II. Response to the Arguments while Holding that the Blessed Virgin was not Conceived in Original Sin

A. To the Principal Arguments

41. Now if the negative side of the question be maintained, the response to all the authorities for the contrary side [nn.2-11] is that any natural son of Adam is a debtor for original justice and, because of Adam’s demerit, he lacks it; and therefore any such son has a source whence to contract original sin. But if someone is given grace in the first instant of creation of his soul, he would never lack original justice; and this, however, not of himself but from the merit of another if grace is conferred on him because of the merit of another; therefore anyone would have original sin, as far as concerns himself, unless another prevented it by mediation. And thus are the authorities to be expounded, because everyone naturally propagated from Adam is a sinner, that is, all have - from the way they possess nature from Adam - the source whence they would lack owed justice unless it was conferred on them from elsewhere. But just as grace could be conferred after the last instant, so it could be conferred in the first instant.

B. To the Arguments Given for the Common Opinion

42. The same point makes plain the response to the reasons given for the first opinion [nn.14-16], because Mary would most of all have needed Christ as redeemer; for she would have contracted original sin by reason of common propagation unless she had been prevented by the mediator’s grace; and just as others needed Christ so that the sin already contracted might, through his merit, be remitted to them, so she had more need of a mediator preventing the sin ever needing to be contracted by her and preventing her contracting it.

43. And if it be argued against this that ‘she was naturally a daughter of Adam before she had grace, because she was a person before she had grace,a so in that prior stage she was, because she was a natural daughter of Adam, under obligation for original justice and lacked it, therefore in that prior stage she contracted original sin’ - I reply by saying that, when opposites are compared to the same thing according to the order of nature, both of them are not present together but only one is, and the other - which is said to be prior in nature - is not present (because an opposite is not present at the same instant); but it is said to be ‘prior in nature’ because it would then be present as far as concerns the side of the subject unless something else (from the outside) were to prevent it.Scotus, Lectura 3 d.2 n.52, “not both but one fails to be present, and that one is present which - as far as depends on the idea of the subject - the subject determines for itself, unless it is impeded.” ⁴⁴

a.a [Interpolated note] How does this stand with the proposition, often alleged in d.2 [nn.68-69, 74, 88, 93, 106 supra], that ‘the nature is perfect in the same instant in which it would be a person in itself’? They stand because here the opposites are only understood through two instants.

44. Therefore if I compare the matter to the form and the privation, the matter without the form is naturally prior to the matter with the form: not that in the instant in which it has the form it does not really have it, because then contradictories would be true together, but that then the matter - as far as depends on itself - does not, when left to itself, have the form if another who has it were not to give it.a Similarly, the subject is naturally prior to either opposite, because each thing is naturally ‘what it is in itself’ before it is, or is not, ‘what it is in another’ - and so the matter not only has the privation naturally before it has the form but it also is in itself naturally before it has the privation or the form; nor yet does it follow that it is at any time so in itself that it is neither under the privation nor under the form, because, considered in this way, there is only the fact that its proper and quidditative idea - which is said to be ‘prior’ - essentially includes neither of the other two.

a.a [Interpolation] Yet the nature in itself is prior to each - both to the privation and to the form - and is neither, because its nature is neither privation nor form. And the Commentator proves this in Physics 1 com.79 (see Ord. 2 d.1 n.61 supra).

45. Thus, in the issue at hand, I say that the nature of the soul naturally precedes both original justice (or the equivalent grace) and the lack of owed justice, and further the lack - in that nature - of original justice naturally precedes the justice because, as far as depends on the subject (which is naturally prior to either opposite), the privation would be naturally present before the form; yet it is not necessary that the soul is at any time under neither of the opposed extremes, nor that it is under the privation before it is under the opposite.

46. So when it is argued that ‘she was naturally a daughter of Adam before she was justified’ [n.43], I concede that a consequence of her nature - as so conceived in the first instant of nature - was that she was a daughter of Adam and did not have grace in that instant of nature; but it does not follow that ‘therefore in that instant of nature she was deprived [of grace]’, speaking of the altogether first instant, because her nature, according to that firstness, preceded as naturally the privation of justice as the justice itself; but only this can be inferred, that to the idea of her nature belongs that it is naturally the foundation of filiation from Adam, and that in that nature - as such - there is included neither justice nor its lack, which I concede.

47. But if you object about the other mode of priority in nature, that she naturally lacks justice first before she has it, because the lack is in her by an intrinsic cause [sc. because she is a daughter of Adam], I say that this ‘first in nature’ is never naturally in her, but would only be present in her if an extrinsic cause did not impede it and posit the presence of its opposite, just as, if in the first instant of nature the matter had the form, the privation (which would otherwise naturally be in the matter) would never be in it.a

a.a [Interpolation] If you ask ‘how is that thing prior in nature which is not prior in being?’, I say that when the order of nature is between positives, as between subject and accident, matter and form, what is prior in nature can be prior in being; but when it is only between opposites, priority ‘by comparison to a third’ means only that this one would be present if the other did not impede it; or it is priority in understanding, namely because this one, as ‘being deprived’, is understood first.

48. And if the argument is made, ‘she is not just in the first instant of nature, therefore in that instant she is non-just’ (from De Interpretatione 10.19b19-30), I say that the consequence is not valid in the case of composite predicates, as ‘it is not white wood, therefore it is non-white wood’; so here with ‘she is not just in the first instant, therefore she is non-just in the first instant’, because the sense of ‘she is not just in the first instant’ is that she is not just in the first instant of nature as far as concerns her idea; so to say, ‘she is non-just in the first instant from her idea’, does not follow, because neither of these inferences is essentially included.

49. And if you argue, ‘in the first instant of nature she is understood to be nonjust’, I say no but ‘she is not understood to be just’, and “in things abstracted there is no falsehood” (Physics 2.2.193b35), because not everyone, when not understanding ‘this’, understands ‘not this’ [cf. d.14 n.31 infra].a

a.a [Interpolation] like someone who, not understanding ‘man being an animal’, understands it as ‘not being an animal’, because then abstraction, by the taking away from something what is essentially present in it, could not be without falsehood.

50. To the other point [n.14], about the opening of the door, it is plain that the door was opened to her through the merit of Christ’s passion foreseen and accepted specifically in its order to this person [sc. Mary], so that, because of that passion, sin would never be present in this person and so neither anything on account of which the door would be closed, although however there did belong to her, from her origin, the source whence the door would be closed to her, just as it was to others.

51. And if you say, ‘therefore if she had died before her Son’s passion she would have been blessed’, the response can be made that the holy fathers in limbo were purged from original sin and the door was closed to them up to the payment of the owed penalty. For God had so determined that, although he would accept the foreseen passion of Christ for the remitting of original guilt to every believer and believer-to-be in the passion, yet he was remitting the penalty due the sin - namely the lack of vision - not because of the passion as foreseen, but because of the passion as displayed in its presence; and therefore, just as the door was not opened to the fathers until the passion of Christ was displayed, so it is probable that it would not have been opened to the blessed Virgin either.

C. Specifically to the Arguments of Bernard

52. To Bernard’s argument [nn.9, 11] the reply can be made that in the instant of conception of the natures [sc. body and soul] there would have been sanctification, not from the guilt that was then present, but from the guilt that would have been present if grace had not then been infused in the soul.

53. And if it is argued that ‘there was lust there’, this is false of the conception of natures, although it could be conceded that there was lust in the conception and mixing of the seeds. And given that in the conception of the seeds there would have been conception of the soul, there would not have been anything making it unacceptable that grace was then infused in the soul because of which grace the soul would not have contracted any infection from the flesh, or from the body, along with the lust sown; for just as infection of the body - contracted through propagation - has been able to remain along with grace in the cleansed soul after the first instant of baptism, so can this be the case in the first instant if God then created grace in Mary’s soul.